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Raul Caruso* 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two 
asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a 
contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the 
option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the 
conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments 
in ‘conflict management’ - labelled as ‘talks’. It will be demonstrated that 
the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake does constitute a powerful 
force influencing agents’ behaviour. In particular, (a) whenever the 
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is extremely large there is no 
room for cooperation and a conflict trap emerges; (b) whenever the 
degree of asymmetry falls within a critical interval cooperation seems to 
emerge even if only the agent with the higher evaluation of the stake 
makes a concession, proportional to the optimal choice of ‘talks’; (c) as the 
evaluations of the stake converge only reciprocal concessions (capturing a 
kind of strong reciprocity) made by both agents can pave the way for 
cooperation.  In such a case, the existence of reciprocal concessions paves 
the way for establishing a potential settlement region (PSR) given that 
both parties can be better off while expending resources in ‘talks’. Finally, 
throughout the paper, the concept of entropy is applied as a tool for the 
measurement and evaluation of conflict and conflict management. 
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RECIPROCITY IN THE SHADOW OF THREAT 
 
Raul Caruso 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The basic question of this work is whether a particular form of strong 
reciprocity can favour the establishing of conflict management procedures 
between rational agents involved  in a destructive conflict. In particular, this 
is the story of two rational agents clashing over the redistribution of a 
divisible stake. Due to the absence of norms and institutions governing and 
enforcing the redistribution of the stake they compete by means of positive 
investments in arms and violent efforts.  
In order to better analyse the emergence of conflict management 
some assumptions about the conflict situation are needed. Then, 
throughout the paper a conflict interaction is assumed to be: a destructive 
interaction which involves strategic interdependent decisions in the 
presence of coercion and anarchy. This concept of conflict relies to a large 
extent upon three main interdependent features: (i) coercion; (ii) anarchy; 
(iii) wastage of resources.  
The first fundamental feature of conflict is the presence of coercion. 
By coercion, I intend that kind of behaviour that is shaped and influenced 
by the existence of a credible threat. A credible threat depends upon the 
potential exploitation of brutal force. Albeit with different approaches, the 
importance of threat has been brilliantly expounded by John Nash (1953), 
Thomas Schelling (1960/1966), Kenneth Boulding (1963) and John 
Harsanyi (1965). The existence of a threat sheds light on the characteristic 
feature of conflict – namely, that while involved in a conflict the choices of 
an agent are choices made under coercion. Even though agents have options 
to make a choice, this is not purely voluntary. Take extortion. In economic 
terms, it is nothing but a monetary transfer flowing from an individual to 
another.  A shopkeeper under the credible threat of a racketeer has a choice. 
(S)He could not acquiesce to the extortion. Whatever the outcome of this 
interaction it would have been a choice under coercion.      
The second characteristic feature of conflict is anarchy. By ‘anarchy’ I 
simply mean nothing but the absence of rules, norms and institutions 
governing agents’ behaviour. As noted above, it is a state-of-nature 
environment where allocations of resources are determined also through 
the exploitation of brutal force. Albeit appearing to be a worst case scenario, 
this does not imply that a conflict cannot be managed or solved. It can be 
managed and solved only in the presence of endogenous ‘rules-of-the-game’ 
governing the interaction. There is no hierarchical way of mediation and 
conciliation as that provided by states or – broadly speaking – by organised 
communities.     
The third key feature is that conflict is costly and wasteful. Positive 
expenditures in conflict are irreversible sunk costs. In particular, conflict 
efforts are interpreted as unproductive activities leading to inefficiencies in 
economic life. This is in the spirit of the definition provided by Bhagwati 
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(1982), who proposes a general taxonomy for a broader range of economic 
activities representing ways of making profit in spite of being directly 
unproductive, conflicts, contests and rent-seeking can be considered 
directly unproductive activities (DUP). According to this view, such 
activities yield pecuniary returns but do not produce goods and services 
which enter a utility function, either directly or indirectly through increased 
production or availability to the economy of goods that enter a utility 
function.  
However, conflicts are rarely a simple exploitation of brutal force. 
Most conflicts involve remarkable bargaining and communication efforts 
between the antagonists. Beyond violence, as applied when sending actual 
or potential threats, agents apply other instruments to successfully end any 
struggle. During a war, for example, the exploitation of actual violence is 
often interlinked with diplomatic efforts. Diplomatic negotiations are often 
conducted while troops are deployed on the battlefield. In international 
interactions, the exploitation of potential or actual violence cannot be 
disentangled from partial openings and cooperative behaviours. In general 
they could be labelled broadly as ‘conflict management efforts’. What is the 
nature of such conflict management efforts? By conflict management can be 
indicated the entire set of joint actions available to the opponents in order 
to be better off whilst reducing the intensity of conflict. Moreover, what 
agents pursue while managing the conflict is also the establishing of a 
certain ‘rules-of-the-game’ governing the conflict interaction. Given the 
non-cooperative environment it must be a self-enforcing joint strategy that 
make parties better off allowing for the emerging of institutions. In a 
broader view, ‘conflict management efforts’ can involve a wide spectrum of 
activities. For expository convenience, consider among others: (i) 
bargaining; (ii) communication and strategic information transmission; (iii) 
costly signalling. Alike efforts exerted in offending and hindering other 
agents’ behaviour, efforts exerted to manage or solve the conflict fall within 
the broader category of unproductive activities. This is not a novelty. Pigou 
(1921/1929) already enlisted ‘bargaining’ amongst the sources of 
inefficiency in public and private sectors of the economy. Using his words 
“[…]Of bargaining proper there is little that need be said. It is obvious that 
intelligence and resources devoted to this purpose, whether on one side of 
on the other, and whether successful or unsuccessful yield no net product 
to the community as a whole. […] these activities are wasted. They 
contribute to private,  but not to social,  net product […]”1 
In Caruso (2006a) and Caruso (2007) I borrowed the labelling of the 
‘Bad Cop and the Good Cop Game’ in order to give a simple and appealing 
depiction of this idea. This paper does constitute an extension of these 
foregoing works. In particular, this paper aims to study the emergence of a 
conflict management scenario grounded upon strong reciprocity. Here I 
would recall a definition of strong reciprocity as presented by Gintis (2000). 
Borrowing his words: […]Homo Reciprocans exhibits what may be 
                                                 
1 Pigou (1929) p. 202-203. 
 5
called strong reciprocity, by which we can mean a propensity to 
cooperate and share with others similarly disposed, even at a personal 
cost, and a willingness to punish who violate cooperative and other social 
norms, even when punishing is personally costly[…].2 Then, in such a view, 
the existence and the awareness of punishments shape any reciprocal and 
strategic behaviour leading to establishing norms and institutions. The idea 
of strong reciprocity does fit dramatically well with the vigorous argument 
of ‘integrative relationship’ and ‘grants economy’ as presented by Kenneth 
Boulding (1962/1973). To Boulding, any social system can be divided into 
three large, overlapping and interacting sub-systems: exchange, threat and 
integrative system. They do not occur in pure form. All human institutions 
and relationships involve different combinations of all three. Using 
Boulding’s words: ‘the integrative response is that which establishes 
community between the threatener and the threatened and produces 
common values and common interest’3. The integrative system involves 
many different concepts. Among individuals, an integrative relationship 
involves a complex spectrum of feelings, such as respect, love, affection and 
so on. It also involves other concepts emerging between individuals as well 
as organisations: legitimacy, status, sense of identity, community etc. etc. In 
general terms, an integrative system needs to exhibit a convergence and 
interdependence of utility functions of parties involved. Moreover, the key 
feature of integrative systems is the existence of ‘grants’. In general terms, a 
grant is supposed to be a unilateral transfer from an individual, a group or a 
social unit to another. When it occurs, the donor agent does not receive 
anything in return.  
Then, in this paper I model a conflict involving a costly commitment 
to conflict management between agents. This behaviour is captured by 
means of the existence of ‘grants’ or ‘transfers’ provided, under some 
conditions, by each agent to the opponent. Hence, they shape a mechanism 
of reciprocal concessions. However, In such a framework, brutal conflict an 
threats do not vanish. In the light of the theoretical foundations expounded 
above any cooperative behaviour grounded on reciprocity will constitute a 
kind of ‘armed cooperation’. But it is reasonable to consider that they do 
have a different impact on the conflict interaction. This is the rationale of 
labelling reciprocity in the shadow of threat. 
Eventually, a key-feature of this work is that agents evaluate 
differently the stake of the conflict. This is a fundamental and crucial 
assumption. Investigating how agents form their own beliefs goes far 
beyond the aim of this work. However, it appears clear that the asymmetry 
in the evaluations does constitute a really powerful force shaping parties’ 
behaviour. In particular, it is possible to show how agents’ choice of fighting 
and ‘negotiating’ depend upon the degree of asymmetry in the evaluations. 
As a simple consideration, recall that the evaluation of the stake can be 
translated in ‘incentive’ for all parties involved. Conflict and Conflict 
                                                 
2 Gintis (2000) p. 262. Emphasis is in the original text. Italics turned into bold.  
3 Boulding (1963a) p. 430. 
 6
management can follow the same incentive. On one hand, the higher is the 
incentive the more brutal is the conflict. On the other hand, the incentive 
works also in favour of a settlement. That is, in other words, it would mean 
that agents are more prone to conflict management. This can happen when 
agents are rational. In fact, as rational agents the parties evaluate the 
incentives as well as the costs and the benefits of a conflict interaction. In 
fact, conflict management must be interpreted as a complement of fighting.              
The paper is organised as follows. In a first section some formal 
pillars are presented.  In a second section a baseline partial equilibrium 
model of conflict is expounded. The third paragraph does constitute the 
‘core’ of this work. It presents a model of conflict augmented with conflict 
management efforts. It underlines under which conditions a potential 
settlement region can be established. A fourth section is devoted to the 
issue of measurement. It applies the idea of statistical entropy. Finally, the 
last section summarises the results and provides suggestions for future 
research. 
 
CORNERSTONES 
In recent economic literature, Jack Hirshleifer pioneered the work on 
modelling conflict, whose foundations are in Hirshleifer (1987a, 1988, 
1989). The economic theory of conflict4 rests to a large extent upon the 
assumption that agents involved in conflict interactions have to choose an 
optimal level of efforts or resources devoted to the unproductive activity of 
conflict which is necessarily detrimental for welfare. This is central to the 
theory of conflict as well as to the theory of rent-seeking and contests. Given 
the partial-equilibrium framework adopted in this work, the analysis 
produced can be generalized to all these theoretical categories.  
What is mainly outlined in recent literature is that while conflict 
models are usually general equilibrium models, rent-seeking, and contest 
models are partial equilibrium models. This means that conflict models 
should involve a trade-off between productive and unproductive activities 
and the prize (or the rent) of the contest is endogenous. The stake of the 
conflict is interpreted as a joint production which depends on the 
productive efforts of the agents. At the same time, the cost function is 
represented by the foregone production. In such a construction the greater 
the number of the agents, the greater the ‘pie’ to be split. In rent-seeking 
and contest models, the prize (or the rent) is given exogenously. In such a 
case, even if the number of contestants becomes larger, the rent does not 
change. Moreover, rent-seeking and contest models can involve 
unconstrained optimization, whereas conflict models necessarily imply 
                                                 
4 In more recent years several studies extended Hirshleifer’s basic model. See 
among others: Grossman (1991/1998), Skaperdas (1992), Neary (1997a), Anderton 
et al. (1999), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), Alesina and Spolaore (2003/2005), 
Dixit (2004), Spolaore (2004), Caruso (2006b). The literature on the economics of 
conflict has been recently surveyed and deeply expounded in Garfinkel and 
Skaperdas (2006). 
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constrained optimization. Neary (1997b) and Hausken (2005) propose a 
comparison of conflict and contest models along these lines. 
This paper presents a partial equilibrium model of conflict featuring 
two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents. It is intended to 
develop the literature on conflict by tackling three main points: 
 
(i) the existence of a second type of effort (instrument) to win the 
conflict;  
(ii) an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake of the conflict; 
(iii) the existence of reciprocal concessions to favour an agreement 
between agents. 
 
First, note that the definition of conflict given above has a remarkable 
formal implication and marks a difference from rent-seeking and contests. 
Needless to say, in rent-seeking activities, an interest group can voluntarily 
choose whether or not to participate into the competition for public funds. 
In a sport contest – e.g. a race – an athlete can decide not to start. By 
contrast, a conflict interaction in many cases is not a voluntary choice. 
Agents have to participate into it and cannot give up. Of course, this 
assumption does exclude the possibility of escape. In formal terms, what is 
needed is an appropriate mathematical function which does not allow for 
zero efforts in conflict. Formal cornerstone of contest and conflict literature 
is the Contest Success Function (henceforth CSF for brevity). 5 The CSF is a 
mathematical relation that links the outcome of a contest and the efforts of 
the players. It summarises the relevant aspects of what Hirshleifer defines 
the technology of conflict. It retains the independence of irrelevant 
alternative property. That is, the outcome of conflict depend only upon the 
efforts of parties involved. This rules out any impact of a third party.  
There are two functional forms of CSF adopted in literature: the ratio 
form and the logistic form. Hirshleifer (1989), Baik (1998) and Anderton 
(2000) analyse the different impact of these two different functional forms 
for CSF. In the first case, the outcome depends upon the ratio of the efforts 
applied, whilst in the second case it depends upon the difference between 
the efforts committed. The main difference between the two functional 
forms of CSF becomes clear when one agent, say agent 1, puts zero in 
conflict effort. 
In the simplest two-agents case, let ( )jii ggp , denote the probability 
of winning the contest (or alternatively the fraction of the stake) for agent 
i with jiigg ji ≠= ,2,1,, indicating the efforts. The probability of winning of 
agent i  is increasing in agent i ’s efforts and decreasing in the efforts of the 
other agent. The ratio form of the CSF implies that if one of the two 
contestants does not exert any positive efforts, the other grabs all the 
                                                 
5 Selective seminal contributions are by Tullock (1980), O’Keeffe et al. (1984), 
Rosen (1986) and Dixit (1987). See then Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis 
(1998) for a basic axiomatization. See also Amegashie (2006). 
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contested stake, namely ( ) ( )∞∈∀= ,0,10, ii ggp . By contrast, using the 
logistic form, an agent committing zero effort can achieve some degree of 
success. If peace and cooperation have to be defined as the absence of 
violent efforts (with 0== ji gg ), peace can never occur as an equilibrium 
under the ratio form of CSF, because either agent would be likely to defect 
and invest any small positive magnitude in order to raise its fraction of the 
stake to 100%. Then, the choice of ratio form of the CSF is consistent with 
the assumption of coercion as a characteristic feature of conflict. Under 
coercion and credible threat one agent can choose the optimal level of 
conflict efforts but cannot give up its own irreversible investment. To sum 
up, while modeling a conflict the existence of threat would not allow for the 
logistic form of CSF.  
Secondly, as presented above, the aim of this paper is that of 
studying a conflict between two risk-neutral agents that evaluate differently 
the stake and that can use different instruments in order to pursue their 
own maximum utility. Therefore, the outcome of the contest will arise from 
the interaction of such different instruments. In this view, the standard 
one-instrument models commonly adopted in literature can be considered 
as a special case of multi-instruments models. 
Thus, in the continuation of this work I will interpret the second 
instrument in a broad view. It is assumed to capture the vast majority of 
potential conflict management efforts. In reality, It can take different 
shapes. It can involve, among others, elements of communication, 
negotiation and signalling. Under the assumption of complete information, 
the second instrument must be perfectly observable. Henceforth, for 
expository convenience, in the continuation of the work I shall refer to the 
second instrument as ‘‘talks’’ whereas the first instrument will be indicated 
through the traditional ‘‘guns’’.6 Thus to summarise: 
 
(i) the use of a second instrument needs not to be “payoff-
irrelevant”: it must have a direct impact on both agents’ payoffs; 
(ii) the second instrument must also be costly. There is no room 
for cheap talk. In fact, what is needed is a “credibility-cost”. 
Under the assumption of complete information, an observable 
costly effort is also assumed to be credible; 
(iii) investments in conflict management must be irrevocable; 
(iv) the two instruments must be complements. The outcome 
depends upon the mixed effect of ‘guns’ and ‘talks’ 
 
In the theory of contest the use of a second instrument is not a novelty, 
although such approach has not been developed extensively. Baik and 
Shogran (1995) study a contest between players with unknown relative 
ability. Under the assumption of decreasing aversion to uncertain ability, 
agents are allowed to expend resources in order to reduce such uncertainty 
                                                 
6 Of course, being in a partial equilibrium framework the classical tradeoff between 
‘butter’ and ‘‘guns’’ is not considered.     
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through spying. Konrad (2003) enriches a model of rent-seeking 
considering the interaction between two types of efforts: (i) the standard 
rent-seeking efforts to improve their own performance in the view of 
winning a prize; (ii) a sabotaging effort in order to reduce the effectiveness 
of other agents’ efforts. In this model, sabotage is targeted towards a 
particular rival group and reduces this group’s performance. The point of 
interest is that through sabotage a group can increase its own probability of 
winning the prize as well as the other contestants’. Thus, the model predicts 
that sabotage disappears whenever the number of contestants becomes 
large. Caruso (2005b) presents two different models of contest with two 
instruments. The analysis is applied to sport contests in order to consider 
the phenomena of match-fixing and doping. Arbatskaya and Mialon (2005) 
analyse in depth the equilibrium properties of a two-instruments contest 
model and compare the results to those attainable in standard one-
instrument models. In particular, this paper is close to a model proposed by 
Epstein and Hefeker (2003), who model a contest where, the use of a 
second instrument creates an advantage for the player with the higher 
stake.  
Thirdly, this paper can also be linked to the literature of contests 
with asymmetric evaluations. Hillman and Riley (1989), Nti (1999/2004) 
analyses the case of a contest where participants evaluate differently the 
‘prize’ – namely the stake. The common results of this contributions show 
that agents retaining a higher evaluation of the stake exert more efforts in 
the contest than the low-evaluation participants. In particular, Hillman and 
Riley show that asymmetric evaluation deters participation by low-
evaluation agents.  
Eventually, another goal of this paper will be represented by the 
identification of a Potential Settlement Region (henceforth PSR for sake of 
brevity) as the set of possible peaceful agreements.  
 
 
THE PURE CONFLICT MODEL 
Consider two risk-neutral agents, indexed by 21,=i , that are identical in 
abilities. At the same time they have different evaluations of the contested 
stake denoted by ( )0, , 1, 2ix i∈ ∞ = . Given the asymmetry in evaluation, it 
would be possible to write that 1 2x x≠ where the subscripts indicate the 
evaluation of agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. In particular, hereafter 
assume that agent 1 has a higher evaluation than agent 2, namely 1 2x x> . 
Let ( )10,∈δ  denote the degree of asymmetry between the stakes of the two 
agents, namely ( ) 2 10,1 . .s t x xδ δ∃ ∈ = . For sake of notational simplicity, 
throughout the paper I shall use agent 1’s evaluation as a kind of numeraire 
and it will be simply denoted by x .There is common knowledge about such 
hypotheses. 
Under the assumption of risk-neutrality, agents interpret the 
outcome of the non-cooperative interaction as deterministic. That is, given 
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the assumption of risk-neutrality, agents are indifferent between conflict 
and sharing a stake in accordance with the winning probabilities. As noted 
above, the outcome of the conflict is determined through a CSF. The ratio 
form of the CSF used here is: 
 
ji
i
i gg
gp +=   for 21,=i and ij ≠     (1) 
 
Equation (1) is differentiable and follows the conditions below: 
 
0/
0/
0/
0/
0/
0/
1
33
22
33
22
21
<∂∂
>∂∂
>∂∂
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
>∂∂
<∂∂
>∂∂
=+
ji
ji
ji
ii
ii
ii
gp
gp
gp
gp
gp
gp
pp
     (1.1) 
 
The functional form adopted in equation (1) implies that there is no 
preponderance of an agent over the other. This is of course a limiting 
assumption, even if many conflicts fall in this category. Under the 
assumption of risk-neutrality the outcome of the CSF denotes the 
proportion of appropriation going to agent i for 2,1=i . Eventually, 
assuming a linear cost for ‘guns’ the payoff function is given by: 
 
( ) jiizx
gg
ggg ii
ji
ipc
i ≠=−+= ,2,1,, 21π     (2) 
 
Each agent maximizes (2) with respect to ig . Using 2 1x xδ=  and 
suppressing subscripts for notational simplicity, the equilibrium choices of 
‘guns’ (denoted by stars superscripted) are given by7:  
 
( )
( ) .1
;
1
2
2
*
2
2
*
1
xg
xg
pc
pc
+=
+=
δ
δ
δ
δ
       (3) 
 
It is clear that *2
*
1
pcpc gg >  and also that 2,1,0/,0/ ** =>∂∂>∂∂ igxg pcipci δ . Note 
also that 0/ 2*1
2 <∂∂ δpcg and 2/10/ 2*22 <⇔>∂∂ δδpcg . Eventually the payoffs 
are given by: 
 
                                                 
7 As demonstrated in Nti (1999), under constant returns to scale in fighting,  a 
contest with asymmetric valuations has a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium if 
and only if the sum of the valuations is larger than the higher evaluation, namely  
xxx >+δ . 
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( ) ( )
3
* *
1 22 2
1 ; .
1 1
pc pcx xδπ πδ δ= =+ +      (4) 
 
Simple to verify that * * *1 2 , / 0, 1, 2
pc pc pc
i x iπ π π> ∂ ∂ > = . Note also that 
* 2 * 2
1 1/ 0, / 0
pc pcπ δ π δ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ > and * 2 * 22 2/ 0; / 0pc pcπ δ π δ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ > .  
To sum up, both agents exert positive investments in ‘guns’ which are 
increasing in the evaluation of the stake. They both get positive payoffs and 
agent 1, namely the agent with a higher evaluation of the stake, is capable of 
getting a higher payoff by means of a higher level of ‘guns’. 
 
 
RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS 
TO ESTABLISH A POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT REGION (PSR) 
 
As noted above a concession is nothing but a ‘grant’ in Boulding’s language, 
namely a transfer. Let me assume that such a transfer is measured in the 
same unit of both the efforts and the contested stake. Then, suppose that 
such an integrative grant is worth a fraction of the optimal level of resources 
expended for conflict management. Let ( )1,01 ∈s  and ( )1,02 ∈s  denote the 
proportional concessions. A limited assumption is that the latter 
proportional concessions are treated as exogenously given. I made this 
choice for analytical and expository convenience. On the other hand, since 
the concession is worth a fraction of a choice variable it also has an impact 
on the endogenous outcome.  
A simple example can be drawn from International Relations. States 
invest resources in military expenditures and diplomacy. This does clearly 
fit with the idea of ‘guns’ and ‘talks’. Take foreign aid. Foreign aid flowing 
from one state to another commonly falls within the budget of diplomacy. 
Through foreign aid, the donor state attempts to influence the behaviour of 
the recipient. In fact, although foreign aid is supposed to be a unilateral 
transfer provided to address the issues of poverty and development, it is 
also designed to pursue foreign policy objectives of donor countries. 
Thus, consider now the option of a second instrument. Agents 
commit themselves to the use of a second instrument in order to affect the 
outcome of the contest. As mentioned above, the basic model presented 
hereafter follows and partly modifies the one proposed in Epstein and 
Hefeker (2003). In such a framework the traditional CSF is modified in 
order to allow for a second instrument. The two instruments are assumed to 
be complementary to each other. That is, the marginal payoff of an increase 
in ‘guns’ could be enhanced by a simultaneous increase in ‘talks’. Then, the 
use of the second instrument would strengthen the effect of the first 
instrument. Eventually the CSF becomes: 
 ( )
( ) ( ) jiihghg hgp jjii iirci ≠=+++
+= ,2,1,
11
1
     (5) 
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and follows the conditions below: 
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i
hphphp
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gpgpgp
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δ    (5.1) 
 
In particular, the cross partial derivative indicating the complementary 
relationships between ‘guns’ and ‘talks’ is given by:  
 
( ) ( ) 0110 2211
2
>+−+⇔>∂
∂ hghg
hg
p
ji
rc
i      (5.2) 
 
Eventually, assuming linear cost functions, so that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0,0,0 =′′=′′>′>′ iiii hcgchcgc , for both instruments the payoff 
function for each agent become: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 22112211
11
21211 11
1,,, hshgx
hghg
hghhggrc +−−+++
+=π    (6) 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 11112211
22
21212 11
1,,, hshgx
hghg
hghhggrc +−−+++
+= δπ   (7) 
 
after the ordinary process of maximization the optimal choices of both 
agents are: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
−+=+=
−+=+=
1
11
1
11
22
3
*
222
3
*
1
22
2
*
122
2
*
1
xhxg
xhxg
rc
rc
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
     (8) 
 
Note that 0,0 *2
*
1 >> rcrc gg  whereas: 
 ( ) ;10 2 22*1 δδ +>⇔> xh        (9) ( ) .10 3 22*2 δδ +>⇔> xh        (10) 
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That is, in order to have a positive investment in ‘talks’ the value of the 
stake must be sufficiently large. Since the two instruments are assumed to 
exhibit a complementary relationship the incentives to manage the conflict 
follow those of being involved in a conflict. In other words, the agent with 
the higher evaluation of the stake has a higher incentive to manage the 
conflict than his opponent. In order to verify whether the critical points in 
(8) represent a global maximum, it is possible to consider the Hessian 
matrices for both agents. In the appendix are reported the results. The 
analysis shows that ( )*2*1*2*1 ,,, hhgg rcrc  does constitute only a local max. 
Eventually the expected payoffs accruing to the agents are: 
 
( ) ( )( ) xssrc 222
2
2
*
1
1
11 +
+−+−= δ
δδδπ        (11) 
( ) ( )( ) xssrc 22 1
32
1
*
2
1
1 +
+−+−= δ
δδδπ       (12) 
 
So now observe that 0*1 >rcπ  whereas 0*2 >rcπ  if and only if 31 δδ −>s . The 
latter inequality sheds light on a particular aspect. That is, since agent 2 has 
less incentives to manage the conflict - as shown by (8) – a sufficiently large 
transfer is  needed in order to make it better off and influence its behaviour. 
 It is also clear that 0/*1 >∂∂ xrcπ , 0/*1 <∂∂ δπ rc and ( ) 3222*1 /10/ δδπ +>⇔>∂∂ xsrc . That is, the payoff of agent 1 is 
unambiguously  increasing in the value of the stake. It is also 
unambiguously decreasing in the degree of asymmetry in the evaluation of 
the stake between the contestants. The interesting point is that agent 1’s 
payoff is increasing in the concession provided by the opponent if and only 
if the value of the stake is sufficiently large. In particular, the latter 
inequality is also the condition to be fulfilled in order to have a positive 
value for 2h . This is consistent with the underlying hypothesis of this work. 
Only when one agent is going to exert positive efforts in ‘talks’ a concession 
can take place.  
What about agent 2’s payoff? Note also that 
3
1
*
2 0/ δδπ −>⇔>∂∂ sxrc , ( ) 2221*2 /10/ δδπ +>⇔>∂∂ xsrc , and eventually 
that ( ) ( )[ ] 2/3610/ 2421*2 −+<−⇔>∂∂ δδδδδπ src . The first inequality 
confirms that the payoff of agent 2 is increasing in the value of the stake 
only when the condition for a positive payoff is fulfilled. The second 
inequality recalls that only in the presence of a positive investment in ‘talks’ 
of agent 1  agent 2’s payoff is increasing in the concession. Consider the 
latter inequality. The LHS is always negative since ( )1,01 ∈s   and ( )1,0∈δ . 
Then, the inequality holds if the RHS is positive. In particular, it is always 
positive if and only if 68.0>δ . That is, there is a critical level δ~ such that 
(a) for δδ ~> agent 2’s payoff is unambiguously increasing in the degree of 
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asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake; (b) for δδ ~<  agent 2’s payoff is 
increasing in the degree of asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake for a 
particular combination of 1s and δ .  
 As noted in the foregoing sections, a potential settlement region is 
attainable if and only if *2
*
2
*
1
*
1
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1 ,,0,0,0,0
pcrcpcrcrcrchh ππππππ >>>>>> . 
Then recall (4), (11) and (12). Rearranging it is possible to write: 
 ( )
( )22
23
2
*
1
*
1 1
12
+
−−−>⇔> δδ
δδδππ spcrc       (13) 
 
and  
 ( )
( )2
23
1
*
2
*
2 1
12
+
−−−−>⇔> δ
δδδδππ spcrc      (14) 
 
Inequalities (13) and (14) shed light on an important point. Also in this case 
the degree of asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake appears to be as the 
powerful force driving agents’ choices. In particular note that agent 1 has a 
stricter condition to be fulfilled. However, as the degree of asymmetry in the 
evaluation of the stake decreases (as 1→δ ) conditions (13) and (14) 
converge.  
Hence, using (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14) as strict equalities and 
setting an arbitrary value for the contested stake ( 100=x ) it is possible to 
draw the potential settlement region.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 – PSR IN THE PRESENCE OF RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS )100( =x  
 
 
Figure 1 shows the PSR attainable in the presence of conflict and reciprocal 
concessions. The PSR is depicted in a parameter space ( ) 2,1,, =isiδ . The 
horizontal axis represents the degree of asymmetry in evaluation of the 
stake whereas on the vertical axis the value  of both 1s and 2s are presented. 
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The PSR is delimited by ABC. The vertical line indicating 22.0=δ  
represents the condition (10) for 100=x . All the points on the right of line 
AB fulfil condition (10). Then, no PSR can be established when 22.0≤δ . 
Both agents will prefer a pure conflict scenario. In other words the latter 
condition implies that when the asymmetry in evaluation of the stake is 
extremely large a PSR is not attainable. In such a case I would say that a 
Conflict Trap emerges. 
At the same time, all the points on the left of line  AC fulfil condition 
(14). It is also clear that condition (14) is stricter than (13). Moreover, it is 
clear that the PSR lies above the curve denoting 31 δδ −=s . In particular, 
the latter would guarantee that  agent 2’ s payoffs are positive. Finally, the 
area delimited by ABC does constitute the PSR. Loving parsimony, I could 
say for 100=x , only conditions (14) and (12) need to hold.    
First, it does appear clear that as the asymmetry in the evaluation of 
the stake decreases (as 1→δ ) the value of the proportional concessions 
needed to establish a PSR increase. To better understand the graph, 
consider a simple numerical example. Set 100=x , for 65.0=δ in order to 
have a PSR the lower bounds are simply 85.01 >s  and 57.02 >s . Again for 
85.0=δ the lower bounds are 97.01 >s and 96.02 >s . The table 1 below 
presents a simple numerical example. 
 
TABLE 1  
Numerical Example 
100=x  
δ   1s  2s  PSR 
    
0,15 -0.37 27.88* ◊ 
0.25 0.29 -52.19** ● 
0.35 0.5 -6.56** ● 
0.5 0.71 -0.65** ● 
0.65 0.85 0,57 ● 
0.75 0.92 0.84 ● 
0.85 0.97 0.96 ● 
    
*rearranging the condition exactly is 
88,272 <s  
 ** since 2s is assumed to be bounded 
between zero and one indicating as 
condition the inequality 02 ≥s would 
also suffices. 
 
There is an interesting point arising from the this example. Consider 02 =s . 
Condition (13) reduces to ( ) 0123 <−−− δδδ  and then to 54.0<δ . This is 
the case of an unilateral concession provided by agent 1. That is, when the 
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is sufficiently large a potential 
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settlement region can emerge even if agent 2 is not going to reward the 
opponent. The intuition behind appears to be simple. Since agent 1 has a 
higher incentive to conflict, it has also a higher willingness to settle 
whenever it is able to get a higher payoff. On the other hand agent 1 may 
tempted to influence agent’s behaviour. Moreover, agent 2 - given the 
hypothesis of common knowledge - as recipient of agent 1’ concession, may 
have an incentive to behave strategically. That is, agent 2, albeit favouring a 
settlement, may be tempted to work against it expecting to get a monetary 
transfer. A classical problem of moral hazard can emerge. Note that the 
opposite is not true. In fact if 01 =s  a PSR is no longer attainable. The agent 
with the higher evaluation of the stake cannot exploit the benefits of 
cooperation if it does not commit itself to reward the opponent. In a 
broader view agent 2 retains an advantage over the opponent. On the other 
hand, under common knowledge, positive investments in ‘talks’ ( 02 >h ) 
suffice to signal the agent 2’s willingness of not being involved in a pure 
conflict. Since costly investments in ‘talks’ have been assumed to be credible 
another feasible interpretation is that a process of reputation-building can 
take place. However, regardless of agents 2’ willingness to concede agent 1 
is also better off. Hence it would be possible to say that there is room for an 
integrative relationship facilitated only through an unilateral concession if 
δ  falls within a critical interval denoted by [ ]** ,δδ  where δ*  is the lower 
bound given by condition (10) and 54.0* =δ .  
  Eventually consider what is the scenario if *δδ > . In the interval ( )1,*δ  both agents have to make a positive concession to the opponent. 
Otherwise there is no room for a PSR. In such a case a mechanism of strong 
reciprocity seems to work. In fact, the contested stake is nothing but the 
incentive leading the agents to clash as well as to cooperate. A lower 
disparity makes the pure conflict more profitable and brutal for both agents 
as clarified through equations (4). Hence the  willingness and commitment 
to settle can be considered credible if and only if:  (i) both agents commit 
themselves to cooperation; (ii)  both agents make a concession establishing 
a relationship of reciprocity. In such a view, a relationship based upon 
strong reciprocity can be credible and feasible only in the presence of high 
incentives to conflict. That is, when the asymmetry is not so large a positive 
reciprocal concession made by agent 2 is needed. Therefore, there is no 
room for bluffing or moral hazard here.  
Finally, note also that the degree of asymmetry cannot equal the 
proportional concession. That is in order to have a PSR it is necessary that 
2,1, =≠ isiδ . If 1s=δ  conditions (12) and (14) would not hold 
simultaneously. In other words, this means that an equal compensation 
would not pave the way for conflict management. One might ask why this 
kind of constraint emerges. Being narrative, an adequate compensation 
would help to manage the conflict much better than an exact equal 
compensation.  Re-writing in formal terms δ−>11s .   
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 To sum up, the analysis demonstrated that a PSR is attainable when 
conditions (9), (10), (13) and (14) hold and in particular that: 
 
(a) there is a critical interval ( )δ*,0  where an extreme asymmetry 
in the evaluation of the stake does not allow for any PSR, even 
if in the presence of major reciprocal concession ( 1,1 21 ≅≅ ss ).  
I defined this Conflict Trap; 
(b) there is a critical interval [ ]** ,δδ  such that for [ ]** ,δδδ ∈ a PSR 
is attainable even if 02 =s . In such a case the agent with the 
higher evaluation of the stake retains a higher willingness to 
cooperate.  I would call this Conflict Management under 
unilateral commitment. 
(c) There is a critical interval ( )1,*δ  such that for ( )1,*δδ ∈  a PSR 
is attainable only in the presence of positive reciprocal 
concessions. This scenario recalls exactly the title of the paper: 
Reciprocity in the shadow of threat.   
 
 
MEASURING CONFLICT 
Conflict must be susceptible to measurement. In the standard partial 
equilibrium contest theory the resources expended do constitute the social 
cost of contest. In rent-seeking literature it is defined as the Rent 
Dissipation. Then, recall the optimal choices of violent efforts. It would be 
possible to write that the total cost under pure conflict is: 
 
( ) xggTC pcpcpc 1*2*1 +=+= δ
δ
      (15) 
 
As noted above, conflict management does constitute an inefficient activity. 
Thus, the total social deadweight loss imposed by both conflict and conflict 
management can be decomposed as the sum of the two types of 
expenditure. Recalling (8) the total cost of conflict when both agents expend 
efforts in a second instrument is given by: 
 
( )( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+
+=+++= 1
1
12 22
2
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1 δ
δδ xhhggTC rcrcrcrcrc     (16) 
 
To give a numerical example, set 100=x  and it would be possible to write 
that 37.0>⇔> δpcrc TCTC . Then, there is a critical interval  ( )**** ,δδ  such 
that for ( )**** ,δδδ ∈  a conflict management scenario imposes a lower social 
cost than pure conflict. For 100=x such interval is given by 37.022.0 << δ , 
where the lower bound denotes the critical value of δ  dictated by condition 
(10).  
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Hence, whenever the evaluations are less asymmetric, a scenario of 
conflict management would be more detrimental for welfare then a pure 
conflict scenario. However, as noted by Epstein and Hefeker (2003) since 
agents evaluate the stake differently it is necessary to look at the relative 
rent dissipation (RRD). It is defined as follows: 
 
* *
1 2
TCRRD
p x p xδ= +         (17) 
 
Where *1p and 
*
2p  are exactly (1) and (5) evaluated in equilibrium. Then in 
case of pure conflict the RRD is given by: 
 
2 1
pcRRD δδ= +         (18) 
 
whereas in conflict management it is given by: 
 
( )( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+
+=
x
RRDrc 1
1
12 22
2
δ
δδ
       (19) 
 
Then it is possible to compare (18) and (19). The plot below scales the value 
of the stake against the level of asymmetry in evaluation.  
 
 
FIGURE 2– RELATIVE RENT DISSIPATION IN PURE CONFLICT AND 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
 
It is clear that as the evaluations of the stake converge - for a sufficiently 
large value of x - the RRD in conflict management is higher than in pure 
conflict scenario. From an economic point of view this would also mean that 
a conflict management scenario is less efficient than pure conflict.  
However, it is clear that such a measurement could be unsatisfactory 
to analyse the realm of conflicts. If efficiency were a criterium for policy 
decision no conflict would emerge. Or more paradoxically, no conflict 
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management would emerge. As a result, further analysis is necessary. It 
would also be reasonable to identify a complementary measure for conflict 
and conflict management. An appealing idea for a more useful evaluation 
can be related to those of disorder and randomness. In fact, since conflict is 
a destructive interaction between two or more parties, it seems reasonable 
to consider also the degree of uncertainty it spreads. In actual violent 
appropriative conflicts, uncertainty about the final outcome does clearly 
constitute a characteristic element that should be considered in developing 
devices to solve the conflict itself.  
A complementary measure of uncertainty as the degree of disorder 
can be captured through the concept of statistical entropy. In 
communication theory and physical sciences, entropy is commonly adopted 
as a measure of the degree of disorder, uncertainty or randomness in a 
system.8 The famous reference is the work of Shannon and Weaver (1949), 
which posed the quantitative foundations of information theory. In such a 
framework, entropy is defined as:  
 
1
1
( ,..., ) ln ,
n
n i i
i
E p p k p p
=
= − ∑       (20) 
 
where k  is an arbitrary constant which can be set to unity without loss of 
generality.9 The greatest disorder would occur when all outcomes have the 
same probability, i.e. 1/ip n=  for 1,...i n= . The degree of disorder is given by: 
(1/ ,...,1/ ) lnE n n k n= . For instance, in the limiting case of 2n =  and 1k =  the 
degree of disorder will be given by ln(2)E = . In order to refine the use of 
entropy for measurement of conflicts, it would also be useful to introduce 
the concept of relative entropy. Relative entropy is defined as the ratio of 
the actual to the maximum entropy in a system. That is, it would be useful 
to recognize the extent to which the degree of disorder approaches the 
maximum level attainable. In formal terms it is possible to write the relative 
entropy as: / ( )RE E Ln n= . Then, relative entropy for pure conflict and 
conflict management respectively will be: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( )1 2* *
1 ln 1 ln
( , )
1 ln(2)
pcRE p p
δ δ δ δ
δ
+ + −= +      (21) 
 
and  
 
                                                 
8 Consider, among others, some applications of entropy to social sciences: the 
Nobel graduate in physic Dennis Gabor applied entropy to the measurement of 
social and economic freedom in Gabor and Gabor (1958). Entropy has also been 
proposed as a measure of competitiveness and diversification in market structure: 
see Attaran and Zwick (1989) and Horowitz and Horowitz (1968). 
9 The form adopted here is the one presented in Campiglio (1999), ch.4. 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) )2ln(1 )ln(21ln1, 2
222
*
2
*
1 +
−++= δ
δδδδppRE rc      (22) 
 
Figure 3 clearly shows that relative entropy is unambiguously lower in the 
presence of ‘talks’. At the same time, it is worth noting that whenever agents 
exert positive efforts in conflict management, the system fails to achieve its 
maximum possible degree of entropy at a relatively lower rate. 
 
  
FIGURE 3 – RELATIVE ENTROPY IN PURE CONFLICT AND CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Although entropy appears to be an appealing concept to evaluate conflicts 
and contests, some points should be highlighted. First, a remarkable point 
of interest which would deserve further attention is related exactly to the 
functional form of CSF adopted. In particular, if entropy is used as a 
measure of the degree of disorder, it would be clear that it will depend 
directly on some elements missing in this work (i) the technology of 
conflict; (ii) the number of contestants; (iii) the abilities of contestants; (iv) 
the existence of institutional constraints or noises.  
The result of this section also raises questions on the trade-off 
between efficiency losses and the degree of disorder. There could be 
equilibria where a lower degree of disorder could be attainable with a higher 
waste of resources. However, the social waste of resources is higher than in 
a pure conflict scenario. This simple consideration would represent a crucial 
point for a future research agenda. A trade-off between the loss of resources 
and the degree of turbulence could clearly emerge. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper considered a partial equilibrium model of conflict with two risk-
neutral agents. In particular, the paper analysed the impact of reciprocal 
concessions on agents’ willingness to manage the conflict. By means of a 
classical comparative statics mechanism, agents are assumed to prefer a 
conflict management scenario if and only if they are better off making 
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positive expenditures in costly ‘talks’. Otherwise they would prefer being 
involved in pure conflict. Since the agents evaluate differently the contested 
stake, there are asymmetric incentives both in fighting and in managing the 
conflict.  
The analysis showed that, when evaluations are sufficiently 
asymmetric, agent 1 – namely the agent with the higher evaluation of the 
stake – would be willing to concede a positive fraction of its expenditure in 
‘talks’ to the opponent. This kind of commitment is due in order establish a 
PSR. This mechanism is also incentive-compatible given that both parties 
can be better off. It is interesting to note how these results can shed new 
light upon some common insight. In the traditional literature on contest, 
the agent with the lower evaluation of the stake was indicated as ‘underdog’ 
(Dixit 1987, Nti, 1999). Such a labelling was grounded upon the 
consideration that the agent with the higher evaluation is unambiguously 
favoured to win the contest. Instead, in the framework considered, the 
agent with the lower evaluation could be favoured. In fact, it can receive a 
unilateral transfer from the opponent without providing anything in return. 
On one hand, the transfer can be interpreted by agent 1 as a tool to 
influence agent 2’ s behaviour. There could be room for some kind of 
hierarchical structure. On the other hand, the integrative mechanism, based 
upon unilateral commitment,  can also have ambiguous impact. Under the 
hypothesis of common knowledge, agent 2, the recipient of the concession, 
can have an incentive to behave strategically: agent 2, albeit favouring a 
settlement, may be tempted to work against it expecting to get a monetary 
transfer. As noted above, a classical problem of moral hazard can emerge.      
However, such a mechanism does not work when the asymmetry in 
evaluations is extremely large. In such a case a conflict trap emerges. That 
is, no agent is going to make positive expenditures in ‘talks’. They only 
invest in ‘guns’. The pure conflict scenario is always the preferred option.  
By contrast, when the evaluations do not differ so much, no PSR is 
feasible unless both agents reciprocally reward the opponent by means of a  
fraction of their own  expenditures in ‘talks’. In such a case, both agents are 
better off if they make positive expenditures in ‘talks’ and a positive 
concession to the opponent. In such a case, the conflict would be expected 
to be more destructive. In fact, the lower the asymmetry the bigger is the 
amount of resources devoted to ‘guns’. Then, a credible commitment to 
manage the conflict is needed in order to establish a PSR. There is no room 
for moral hazard or bluffing here. Without any concession provided by 
agent 2, agent 1 would prefer the pure conflict and it would be the most 
favoured party. Then, agent 2 also has an incentive to manage the conflict 
and to make a positive concession to agent 1. Given that, a mechanism of 
reciprocity can take place only in the shadow threat.     
Thus, the main results are summarised below: 
 
a) In the presence of agents with identical abilities and different 
evaluations of the stake, whenever the evaluations are sufficiently 
asymmetric, a PSR can be established if and only if the agent with the 
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higher evaluation of the stake is willing to make a proportional concession 
to the opponent. If the concession enters additively the payoff function of 
the recipient, both parties can be better off if the degree of asymmetry falls 
within a range [ ]** ,δδ ; 
c) As the evaluations of the stake converge, namely for 1δ → , a PSR 
is attainable if and only if both agents are willing to make a proportional 
concession to the opponent. This is the case of Reciprocity in the shadow of 
threat. 
d) When the evaluations are extremely asymmetric, namely for 
0δ → , a PSR cannot be attained even if a concession is ensured. Call this 
Conflict Trap. 
 
The results of the paper can be also considered as a contribution to the 
study of self-enforcing arrangements. In the first case, by means of a 
credible self-imposed concession, agent 1 is able to influence agent 2’s 
behaviour and lead it to manage the conflict. In the latter it is clear that 
since both agents concede a positive fraction of their ‘talks’, the 
enforcement must be ensured. It is clear that the impact of credibility is also 
strongly sensitive to the assumption of common knowledge. Therefore, 
given the limiting assumptions, the PSR can be considered as a credible and 
incentive-compatible structure. Credibility has been assumed to be related 
to the cost of conflict management. Since efforts in conflict management – 
‘talks’ - are costly and total outlays are irreversible, they are supposed to be 
credible. In a broader view, the results can surround a theory of how 
institutions emerge and evolve. In particular, interpreting institutions as 
products of conflict management procedures, sheds light upon the 
(commonly underestimated) role of coercion in their emergence and 
evolution.  
However, the critical issue of the model is the stability of such a 
solution. In this respect, it is significant that – formally speaking – the 
optimal choices in the ‘conflict management’ scenario do not constitute a 
global max. They do only constitute a local max. In reality, cheating does 
always constitute an option for participants.   
As a novelty of this work, I would also quote the use of the concept of 
entropy as a tool for measurement of conflict. Following the common 
neoclassical approach, investing in conflict management would be welfare-
immiserizing. In fact, conflict management can also be considered an 
unproductive activity. Therefore, a pure conflict would be preferable to a 
scenario where agents invest resources in conflict management. 
Establishing a PSR would be less efficient than pure conflict. An appealing 
idea for a more useful evaluation can be related to those of disorder and 
randomness. In fact, since conflict is a destructive interaction between two 
or more parties, it seems  reasonable to consider the degree of uncertainty it 
spreads. In actual violent appropriative conflicts, uncertainty about the final 
outcome does clearly constitute a characteristic element that should be 
considered while developing policies to solve the conflict itself. It has been 
shown that the level of entropy also depends on the level of the asymmetry 
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in the evaluation of the stake. In particular, the point of interest is that as 
the asymmetry in evaluation decreases, the degree of disorder and 
turbulence increases. In particular, in presence of efforts devoted to conflict 
management, the degree of disorder is lower.  
The aim of this work was to build a general baseline model. Anyway, 
many elements are still missing in this work. These would pave the way for 
extension of this work. Consider among others: (i) the impact of different 
endowments; (ii) an asymmetry in abilities; (iii) an asymmetry in costs 
structure. In particular, assuming convex costs for conflict could be a more 
realistic assumption; (iii) risk aversion of contestants; (v) a different 
protocol of interaction. That is, for example, instead of being maximizing 
units, agents could be assumed to minimize the ‘distance’ from an ideal 
payoff. Different protocols of conflict management are presented in Isard 
and Smith (1982). 
In particular, since it was clear that the powerful force driving agents’ 
behaviour was constituted by the asymmetry in the evaluation, remarkable 
points deserving further extension are the impact of a larger time horizon 
and the setting of a learning process. The model expounded in this work is a 
timeless model. Nevertheless, consider a possible application to a multi-
period interaction. Assume for example that a dynamic interaction involves 
a learning process. Then imagine that such a learning process can modify 
the asymmetry in evaluation. Consider for example that evaluations of the 
stake converge over time. Furthermore, you can also imagine that some 
peculiar features of agents modify (consider among others: production 
function, access to market, investment in new technologies etc). In such a 
case, in a future period (say t n+ ), the asymmetry in evaluation can 
decrease, namely t n tδ δ+ > . In such a case, according to the results of the 
model, preferences for conflict or settlement can change. Broadly speaking, 
a superior information can have an ambiguous impact.   
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APPENDIX 
To check whether the critical points presented in (8) constitute a Nash 
Equilibrium I have to compute the Hessian matrices for both agents.  
I start considering the payoff function of agent 1 evaluated at the critical 
points for agent 2, namely ( )*21*211 ,,, hhggrcπ . It becomes: 
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and the Hessian matrix is given by: 
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Let 1kH denote the thk order leading principal submatrix of 1H  for 1,2k = . The 
determinant of the kth  order leading principal minor of kH1  is denoted by 
1kH . The leading principal minors alternate signs as follows: 
 
011 <H  
 ( )( ) 01146430 1246812612 <+++++−⇔> hgxH δδδδδ  
 
Then I compute the payoff function for agent 2 ( )2*12*12 ,,, hhggrcπ , 
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and the Hessian matrix is given by: 
 
 25
( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ] ⎟⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
++++
++−
++++
+++−++
++++
+++−++
++++
+++−
=
=
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
3
2
224
2
26
42432
2
5
3
2
224
2
24
2
224
2
2422435
3
2
224
2
24
2
224
2
2422435
3
2
224
2
24
2
2
42435
22
2
22
2
22
2
22
2
2
112
122
112
11212
112
11212
112
1122
hgx
xg
hgx
hgxx
hgx
hgxx
hgx
hx
hhhg
ghggH rcrc
rcrc
δδδ
δδδ
δδδ
δδδδδδ
δδδ
δδδδδδ
δδδ
δδδ
ππ
ππ
 
 
Also in this case, let 2kH denote the thk order leading principal submatrix of  
2H for 1,2k = . The determinant of the kth  order leading principal minor of 
2H  is denoted by 2kH . The leading principal minors alternate in sign as 
follows: 
 
021 <H  
 ( )( ) 01146430 2246822422 <+++++−⇔> hgxH δδδδδ  
 
since the Hessian matrices are not negative semidefinite it is necessary to 
deepen the analysis in order to show whether the critical points  represent a 
global max. Then I compute the limits of both agents’ payoffs. For the first 
agent we have:  
 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
12
12
12
12,,,lim 24
12
24
2
3
224
1
26
224
1*
21
*
21101 ++
+++−++++
++=→ δδ
δδδ
δδδ
δδπ gsxs
gx
xghhggrc
h
 
 ( ) −∞=∞→ *21*211 ,,,lim1 hhggrch π  
 ( ) −∞=∞→ *21*211 ,,,lim1 hhggrcg π  
 
( ) ( )( )
12
12,,,lim 24
12
24
2
3
*
21
*
21101 ++
+++−=→ δδ
δδδπ hsxshhggrc
g
 
 
and  for agent 2: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
12
12
12
12,,,lim 24
21
24
1
2
224
2
24
224
2
2
*
12
*
1202 ++
+++−++++
++=→ δδ
δδδ
δδδ
δδδπ gsxs
gx
xghhggrc
h
 
 ( ) −∞=∞→ 2*12*12 ,,,lim2 hhggrch π  
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( ) −∞=∞→ 2*12*12 ,,,lim2 hhggrcg π  
 
( ) ( )( )
12
12,,,lim 24
22
24
1
2
2
*
12
*
1202 ++
+++−=→ δδ
δδδπ hsxshhggrc
g
 
 
therefore for both agents it would be necessary to check for 
2,1,0,0 === igh ii . Consider first the payoff function of agent 1: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
12
12
12
12,0,, 24
12
24
2
3
224
1
26
224
1*
2
*
211 ++
+++−++++
++= δδ
δδδ
δδδ
δδπ gsxs
gx
xghggrc  
 
Maximize ( )*2*211 ,0,, hggrcπ  with respect to 1g  and  let **1g  denote the optimal 
choice. As usual set 100=x  and it would be possible to demonstrate that ( ) ( ) 68.0,,,,0,, *2*1*2*11*2*2**11 <⇔< δππ hhgghgg rcrc .  
 
Then, it is clear that the critical points presented in (8) do no constitute a 
Nash Equilibrium.  
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